Post-May Perspectives

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This pamphlet is the intelligent realistic
written during the to define a long strategy, La^ Foje
(The Way)t which published its (is?) a Trotskyist organization.
Howevert unlike of the other Trotskyist active during Mays it
did not fray "by announcing that it the of move-
ment. Mar did it insist on its organizational continuity in the son-
text of a sectarian strategy as did others. The pamphlet thus
none of the sectarian defects might have expected is an
authentic product of the
La Voie attempts to synthesize all various of the real
struggle in order to project a path toward the formation of a revolu-
tionary party in France^ capable of competing with the Communist Party for
in the working class. The goals of the
are at the outset as is the (revolutionary) legitimacy of
organizational forme which it spontaneously produced. The problem raised
by the authors is, then: how to from this basiss produced by the
Movement to a long term struggle aapable of preparing a victory in the next
round.
The they give is probably the that aould have "been given at
the time. Contrary to those who attempting to build up pre-existing
vanguard sects by individual recruitment and those who hoped to start a
revolutionary "movement" through an prominent leaders
of the , La^Voie^ insisted that the authentio leadership of the move-
ment neither a party nor a few individuals3 but the thousands of
participants in rank and file action conmitteee.
At the time the authors of this pamphlet repeat the argument of
3 9 3
of those f like Cohn-Benditf believed movement could survive with-
building of organization. The impos-
ition of Leninist ie, of eoursef r -ejected* in line with
of the itself f but La_ Fgig rightly points out that of
agitation propaganda in of social like that of defeating
reformist working organisations in revolutionary times* require
organizations of continuous mobilization national coordination
"by purely movements,
ig a whieh continued Mayf a
on the of the participatory democratic organizations
by the movement, believed could be viable
for the Leninist of revolutionary party, la_Voie_ tries to
that the question is badly poeed. Action rank file
not normal political organizations, to on a
long 8trugglet to popularize an ideology through work, to
, train and tmgZgn£ oadve. They the forms in whiah the people
mobilize for revolutionary action in a crisis ,
The problem is not to whether aotion
"better" than parties. The problem is to what functions
those fulfilled by action essential to provide^ through
other organizational form8t for their fulfillment*
Le ¥oie suggests the unification in a democratic party of the
vanguard whish organized itself during the Events in the action and faetory
It for a of transitional leading to
the implantation of this party in working class f to be followed
working class offensives ooeur3 by an active strifes culminating in the
establishment of workers' oounails the overthrow of capitalism.
Be as a projection of
into future. No it is a projection^ tut it is /or iess
to project in this on the o/ real history than on that of an
doctrine, o/ Iki FgJ£ evidently
Jfe party of the it called for Instead Trotekyist
Maoist organizations profited from the with prestige,
the error of principle, or conditions simply unfavorable for
It is impossible to be of answer. Perhaps "had the
Party split middle during Mayt so that a larger and better
working aould taken in the implementation of a strategy
as thi8t it would have In any repression of left
activists in the factories by the Communist Party would then have been more
difficult^ this certainly a major factor in the, failure of the move-
to survive the Events,
The only evidence for this hypothesis is the rather negative results of
the struggle of Il_ Manifesto in Italy, This split-off from the Italian
Commnist Party was, of course, smalls and the strike in
Italy violent than that in France. But II Manifesto
did attempt to unify the various left-wing in an alternative to the
Commniet Party. At the National Workers Conference in Milan on January 20,
19711 they argued for a strategy similar to that of La_ Voie in the following
terms.
Me do not believe.». that the construction of a revolutionary
party is incompatible with the direct stimulation of autonomous
struggles^ nor that today we should concentrate on the first
of to capable of attacking the second,.. It is
only if we oan give the working alass the concrete hope of a polit- •
iaal oonotruetionf capable of its its nature of coordin-
ating and directing the struggle at the general political level,,
that it will pursue its offensive in the factories in spite of
the risks and the sacrifices accompanying this offensive.
39 5
The at unification a failure,, in leftists
to in or pos-
co-op % Party I£ Manifesto with dis-
unity» pay-off Italian Left
collapsed along with which had it into
being.
The La Voie's as a
o/ to o/ o/ sixties,
it will be successfully in a 2?adisalizationt
all the paytieipmts of the for unity the
o/ de-mobilization invariably follows defeat
of
The artiale slightly by of a
of the positions of various Vfenoh political in the Events,
3 9 G
DOCUMENT
BOURGEOIS ELECTIONS OR REVOLUTIONARY ACTION?
by La Vole
The student revolt and the "working class mobilization at
first surprised some and disconcerted others. But today they frighten:
first, the Increasingly 'worried bourgeoisie which killed, murdered.
And neither the threat of civil war nor legislative elections -will hide its
responsibility. Second, they frighten politicians and leaders of the
"French Left". "Enough of violence!" they cry. "Democracy requires
that the electoral campaign take place normally. "
The bourgeoisie has made its choice. So has the tradition-
al "Left". As for those whose sphere of action is in the extra-
parliamentary realm, they continue the fight. The revolutionary mili-
tants - whether they be workers, teachers or students - will contribute
to the development of neighborhood, school and company action com-
mittees, and will seek to confront the union and political leaders with
their responsibilities.
A political theory must take shape. This text atte.rn.pts to
join the on-going discussion, in order to bring out revolutionary per-
spectives .
O C|
A POWERFUL, SPONTANEOUS MOVEMENT
After the first barricades of Friday, May 3, sleeping
France shrugged its shoulders with contempt. A "handful of enjrag^es"
deserved no more. But the confrontations became more violent, more
numerous. Monday, May 6, more than 10,000 demonstrators joined
the rebels. The next day there -were 30, 000. And the night of the
barricades - from the 10 to the 11 May - was a thunder bolt. France
still did not understand, but it was worried: the bourgeoisie had sent
its police against its own sons. As for the workers, they were ready to
throw themselves into the fight. More than two "weeks of strikes, mil-
lions of strikers, thousands of occupied factories: an open struggle
began, revealing the depth of discontent.
For more than two years, the "Left" had been showing the
reality of this discontent by street demonstrations and by its increased
vote in the elections. But never was the mobilization so powerful,
never the political awakening so strong. It was not through any organ-
ization or union that the student revolt expressed itself. All the student
political groups were suddenly placed before the fait accorripji. The
student milieu suddenly exploded. And in just a few days of resisting
the police, the rebels discovered by immediate experience, by concrete
action, the power of a mass movement, little structured though it was.
The young workers - unionized or not - showed the same
determination. The great demonstrations of these last two years (May
17, 1966, February 1, 1967, M.ay 17, 1967...), the great strikes of
393
February-March 1967 could not prevent the government from assuming
full powers. The procrastination of the unions' leaders after the Fall
of 196? could no longer satisfy the rank and file. For over two years
sectorial struggles, leading to partial demands, had been revealing the
limits of the policies of the leadership. This called for a reaction.
May 13th was it. The strike was political, even though the leadership
tried to limit it to a protest against the repression. Because it was by
the millions that the demonstrators accused the powers that be and
called the government into question. In several days, the division fell,
sectorial demands' were put aside. The straight jacket in which the
protest movements had been contained burst open. The political dimen-
sion, which every struggle for union demands possesses, appeared in
the light of day. Numerous young people went beyond the union directives
and "wrestled directly with all their problems. In many small companies
the strike took shape.
Millions of strikers threw themselves Into the battle, even
though strategic perspectives -were unclear. This was because they had
all understood that to obtain satisfaction (at the level of specific demands),
only a struggle at the work place would lead to victory, just as the .mob-
ilization of the students had made the government retreat.
In spite of the pressures of the leadership, the workers
spontaneously learned the lessons of the first student battles. The com-
mitment which they had made - hazy as it was concerning concrete
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results - led. them into the fight. And It was by this struggle that class
consciousness advanced and will advance still further.
The violence of the bourgeoisie called forth the violence of
the .masses. The students and workers responded to each false maneuver
of the bourgeoisie; whether it -was after the first arrests of students,
after the police repression of the Latin Quarter demonstrators, or after
the murders committed by the bourgeoisie. This is indeed the best
school of all.
If the confrontation with the police remained disorganized,
folio-wing no clear directives, passing over to scattered fights, without
tactical preparation, the courage of the demonstrators, the determin-
ation of the combatants mitigated the Insufficiencies. There were never
any urban guerilla commandos, there -were never any clear directives
during the street fights: this the bourgeoisie will never be able to under-
stand. It is obliged to see a small number of chiefs behind each group
of fighters, denying these latter all Initiative. As if not a single rebel
would have been able to determine the attitude to follow without a central
command. In the course of the street fights, the response to police
brutality was organized: molotov cocktails thrown from the roofs test-
ify to this.
In driving the government into a corner, the strikers re-
vealed to all Its true nature and Its real ability to resist. In occupying •
the factories, they broke with the traditional, tactical schemas kept up
by the leadership. Management's power 'was challenged because the
strikers actually blocked the -whole productive apparatus. Managerial
structures in the factories, bourgeois legitimacy were shaken because
a -working class presence on the work-place is a real challenge to them.
In organizing the strike and strike support, thousands of
people learned to work together, discovered and appreciated solidarity,
collective struggle. In one month, thousands and thousands of different
experiences were lived, penetrating the most closed of family milieus,
revealing the opportunism of some, the good qualities of others. It is
the living struggle which forges class consciousness.
The statisticians of IFOP^ can make new opinion polls, can
try again to measure the degree of discontent and combativity. But
they can never sum up the awakening of consciousness in a few numer-
ical givers: they can never put the revolutionary process in an equation.
The class struggle cannot be planned, programmed. It remains alive,
complex, contradictory. Spontaneity should not be broken because
through it mass movements affirm themselves and develop.
Seguy had to state: "Nothing spontaneous happened: sooner
or later the explosion of a long accumulated discontent reflecting legiti-
mate aspirations too systematically scoffed at by a rapacious manage-
ment and a reactionary government had necessarily to occur". Social
degradation is the background of the crisis -which just took place. No .
The french equivalent of the Gallup Poll.
40:1
one can deny it. But to stay at that level is voluntarily to leave aside
the hesitations of the organizations and to ignore all the reactions
against their leaders. And to do so in the hope of self-justification, of
setting aside the determination of the -workers, like those of d'Hispano-
Suiza, Renault or Sud-Aviatioa for example, who continued the strike
after the conclusion of the Crenelle Protocol.
A STILL CONTRADICTORY AWAKENING OF CONSCIOUSNESS
The political awakening was sudden. The whole system of
information, of education was challenged. Bourgeois thought, bourgeois
culture were ridiculed. Taboos, restrictions fell. But political thought,
in spite of a multitude of extremely rich experiences, showed itself to
be very disparate and very contradictory. The most fuzzy and erroneous
theories sprouted and developed rapidly,
For some, we 'were and we are still in a period of "dual
power". Understand by that that the masses said no to the bourgeois
system and that this refusal gave birth to a current which will lead the
workers to power. The revolution Is on the move. Students (by student
power), workers (by workers' power), peasants (by peasant power) will
soon manage their own affairs and the bourgeoisie will have to shut up
and leave. In one word, socialism is around the corner.
Unfortunately this verbiage conjures away all the basic
problems and will lead to numerous disillusionments and serious failures.
In the first place, dual power develops very exceptionally,
i
during very short periods in the course of which the central power, the
power of the bourgeoisie, is pulled apart and destroyed by the exploited,
organized from the bottom up and led by revolutionary militants. This
assumes a simultaneous mobilization of all wage earners on a factory
and neighborhood basis; a general and violent struggle against the
bourgeois system, that is to say, against its administration, its police,
against all its defenders; a revolutionary leadership accepted by the
masses and rejecting all conciliatory perspectives.
But, even though the organization of the "workers at the
grass roots did develop, it never set aside all the reformist organiza-
tions of the Left. During the occupations, few strike pickets allowed the
ununionized to join this organizational embryo. This means that in
spite of a deep challenge to the policy of the parliamentary Left, the
move beyond its leadership remained localized, the strike was only very
rarely an active strike, including all the strikers in the action.
What is more, the confrontation with State power -was never
generalized, global. Of course, there was the attack on the Paris Stock
Exchange, the attack on numerous police stations and prefectures in
Paris and the provinces. These facts prove the combativity of the
demonstrators, their will to transcend the framework of the factory in
order to attack the national leaders, in order to force the bourgeoisie
into a corner again. But they concretize "well the level attained by the
struggle. The confrontation remained partial, little structured, little
403
elaborated. The demonstrators never had the advantage in street fights,
an essential condition, however, if one "wants to smash the oppressive
state. The bourgeoisie "was not defeated.
Finally, the movement, never having succeeded in sep-
arating itself completely from parliamentary and reformist organizations,
never had a revolutionary leadership. No plan of struggle, no concrete
strategic perspectlvci was proposed and realized. It 'will take many a
struggle, many a unification to bring forth a structured movement with
a revolutionary political program understood and put Into practice by
the working masses.
No, there was never any collapse of the State apparatus;
there -was never any dual power. Because, In no case were the workers
within an inch of taking in hand the productive apparatus.
In certain places, it is said, "workers' management was
achieved. It Is true that at Brest, In particular, the -workers sought to
start up production again, for the strikers. Thus, there was indeed
embryonic control - locally. And these concrete experiences are,
again, a very good school. It Is thus that the Internal organization of
the company can be overthrown. No more Informers, no more wage
earners In the service of the bosses, no more executives exercising
simultaneously a technical and a police role. Everyone comes out In
the open and chooses his camp.
But the limits appear Immediately. Who controls invest-
ments ? Who directs all that occurs beyond the Immediate sphere of
production? (That is to say, hiring, research, the perfecting of man-
ufacturing, supplying of raw materials, of semi -manufactured products,
of finished products. ) Who controls the disposal and distribution of
finished products ?
These experiments will fall short so long as they remain
localized in a few marginal enterprises, that is to say, in those the
production of which is in no -way decisive for the global operation of
industry. And in no case can they signify that the "workers have put
production on the path leading to socialism. These remarks are not
intended to minimize what has been tried. Because, this is in fact the
only concrete path by which one can learn lessons and teachings of
great importance. But, on the contrary, it is a question of evaluating
the situation in its real proportions.
Class consciousness asserted itself, concretized itself
through the experiences and battles which -we have just mentioned. But
this is only a beginning, a first trial. The confrontation with the gov-
ernment, a confrontation that we all desire, will only occur when this
awakening of consciousness leads to revolutionary perspectives and
organization. And this will demand a long political preparation, tied
to the daily struggle.
st;*'! «,V thawed its foToet of
on by reformist,
leaders^ shook alt ppe-estabtished if ebbing of
habitual to
will millions of an
of
THE ACTION COMMITTEES IN A DIFFICULT POSITION
Born In the struggle, they have lived all the events. In
them conscious militants gather, but also many young people, throwing
themselves Into a political battle for the first time.
So long as It was obvious what to do (confrontation "with the
police, denounciation of the "Left" organizations. . , ) action could be
improvised from day to day and achieve some results. Spontaneity
reigned and It expressed itself according to the will of events.
So.me attempted to leave the campus ghetto. The action
committees, created In the neighborhoods, saw then a rapid development
In the Paris region, all the more because of the great receptivity of the
population. The nature of the regime had never been so clear, the
policy of the Left so obvious.
But there is more than one shadow on this scene. Intrigues,
designed to co-opt the movement, were numerous, complicating to per-
fection an already confused situation. As if It sufficed to present one-
self as a leader to be applauded and elected to the leadership positions
of an unstructured movement.
Political debates, In the framework of the many proposed
co-ordinations, were more than Insufficient, not to say non-existent.
400
And here we are, with the elections several days away, without being
guided by a political platform.
The action committees were never the organs of a counter-
government. Although they organized strike solidarity (fund raising,
distribution of food. . . ) they were never able to dislocate the bourgeois
apparatus, to attack all its mechanisms and representatives. There
again, we are faced "with a first step in organizing, which must be
evaluated as such.
The early enthusiasm will soon collapse. The members of
the action committees are going to diminish rapidly. Disagreements
will multiply. This indicates the importance of the problems which
remain unsolved.
However, it is in these committees that a first unification
was effectuated. The task now is to preserve the essential, while getting
rid of the folklore of the movement.
THE TASKS OF THE ACTION COMMITTEES
Experience has shown that they are essentially three in
number.
1. Political theoriEing, The day by day struggle, the
enthusiasm of the first fights hid a very big political void. And now
that order has returned, the gaps appear clearly. It is necessary to
learn the lessons of the main events of the month of May: police inter-
vention against students and strikers, the crisis of the university, the
407
social crisis, workers' demands, the first steps toward grass roots
organization, the attitude of the union and political leaders, the reactions
of the population, the grip of electoralist conceptions, the arguments for
a people's government, the necessity of violence, . . Then it will be pos-
sible to go further and to define an extra-parliamentary strategy.
2. Progaganda. Agitation. Carrying all debates into the
streets is a possible and a fruitful experiment. Many committees have
already done it on numerous occasions. Militants should stimulate
agitational work in relation to a precise event (speeches of General de
Gaulle, the murder of workers at Sochaux, unsatisfied, union demands,
the position of an electoral candidate. . . ). And this is the best school
of all, on the condition that its lessons are constantly learned.
3. Liaison with the........factories. It is necessary to pursue and
to systematize -what has already been achieved during the hottest moments,
by informing the wage earners of what has been done in other companies,
in other neighborhoods, by proposing themes for action in relation to
unemployment, professional education, by explaining the .meaning of
extra -par liamentarism.
TOWARD A POLITICAL PLATFORM
Two weeks of strike sufficed for the bourgeoisie to organ-
ize an efficacious repression. The party of order gave full powers to
the prefects. The main revolutionary groups are outlawed. And if the
situation calls for it, tomorrow a dictatorship will be established. The
403
bourgeoisie will not yield before the mass mobilization. This is why
the theory of peaceful passage to socialism is in, fact only a veil, hiding
the complicity and treason of those who pretend to be communists.
But the basic problem is clear:
- either a confrontation with the State apparatus is prepared,
sought, which demands a massive mobilization, organizing the workers
at all levels and the rejection of all conciliation;
- or, profiting from a major social crisis, the Left poli-
ticians avoid confrontation and place themselves in the service of an
important fraction of the bourgeoisie. These leaders had already chosen
this second possibility. Their capitulation in the month of June confirms
it again.
The axis of revolutionary strategy rests on the first pos-
sibility. And it is this orientation which we must concretize in a polit-
ical platform.
1. Parliament remains the locus of permanent conciliation.
It leads inevitably to the -worst political deals, made by specialists, using
the good faith of their electors. This system, must be smashed by bring-
ing out latent anti-parliamentarism. All electoral approaches must be
smashed. The Guy Mollets, Pompidous, Mitterrands, Duhamels,
W. Rochets, Lecanuets can play their subtle game. But the important
thing is not there. It is easy to ridicule these men. But this leaves
the real problems aside, that is to say, the content of the policies they
defend and the use they make of the mandate given them, a use made at
400
the expense of the electors.
Revolutionary politics cannot be a backroom affair, cannot
involve Itself In deals. And the militants "who apply It must be controll-
able, recallable from -within structures not Integrated to the bourgeois
system.
2, Extra-parliamentarism is not a slogan which electoral
candidates can take up for their own purposes. A choice must be made:
either the maintenance and the reinforcement of a political parliamentary
"elite", or the creation of grass roots committees capable of stimulating
struggles In the factories, on the campuses, a struggle begun in May,
1968 and -which will lead to street fighting, to confrontation at all levels
with the representatives of the bourgeoisie. The thousands of strikers
who cried "power Is in the street, in the factory", now need a concrete
action program, enabling them to pursue mass struggle, to burst the
bourgeois structure wherever "workers can get organized.
This path demands a program, of union demands leading to
an active politization, and based on the following themes.
j In order to protect raises from being
rapidly nibbled away, rising prices should be immediately and constantly
compensated by rising wages.
- Struggle _ Against the_Hie_ra.r_ch^ iof_Salarie^s_: the gamut
of financial resources, of salaries should be reduced to the benefit of
the most dis advantaged. The same raise for all, or the 100, 000 Franc
minimum "wage (about 200 dollars) are the concretization of It.
- Struggle Ag ain gj:_D ivi s i on s Be t w e e n Wag e ......... Earner^ : the
forms of salaries are a first divisive element (opposition between hour-
lies and monthlies). Thus, to demand monthly "wages for all is simul-
taneously to knock down several barriers which are still solidly in place
and this makes it possible to simplify all forms of pay. Bonuses, var-
ious and preferential advantages are then to be integrated, into the
monthly "wage.
- Struggle Against Unemployment: unemployment 'will not
disappear without the elimination of exploitation. This does not prevent
us from fighting for the maintenance of industrial jobs, or for obtaining
- The Immia
- Retir ement at 60; which "would proportionally decrease
unemployment .
Moreover, this does not prevent us from demanding that
when workers are forced to change jobs, their qualifications not be
lowered and that they find an at least equivalent post. Because, 'what
is at stake is not only having -work (the right to work) but also the pos-
session of technical and general knowledge sufficient to one day take
over the system.. Thus wage earners today must refuse reclassifications
which are unfavorable to them.
None of these demands "was satisfied in the course of the
last period. Because, given the size of the movement, given their
interlocking nature, the government could not absorb them. It "was here
that the government was challenged and will be again. Very quickly
dissatisfaction at the level of union demands led wage earners to form-
ulate a global challenge; "No to the Fouchet Plan, no to the Gaullist
Fifth Plan, down with the social security ordnances, down with full
powers,
"And if the government does not yield, and if we want
satisfaction, we must therefore take the necessary measures to get our
demands through, we must therefore take power. "
3. Workers' control of the main industrial sectors and
the bourgeois apparatus is thus on the agenda. Isolated experiments
have led to partial management. But in order to extend these experiments,
several conditions must be met;
- the bourgeois apparatus is dismantled. Then it is pos-
sible to annihilate the repressive forces, to control all the financial
circuits, to plan the economy, fixing priorities, foreseeing needs on a
long term basis both at the level of research, of teaching and at the level
of the organization of labor. This means that the working masses,
organized from the bottom up, have confronted bourgeois power.
- the struggle against the State apparatus is completed by
that in the framework of the company. Management's structure of con-
trol and command must be destroyed. Informers, company cops, bosses
will be chased away. Subordinates of management's orders such as
foreman and engineers must resign or be neutralized. Political mili-
tants, also competent at the technical level, must take in hand the
productive apparatus and do so "with the active concourse of workers'
councils. If technical competences are lacking, those who have them
must be subordinated to the "workers' representatives.
Then production can. start up again on a new basis because
the internal structure of the company "will be controlled by the 'workers,
the technical organization of work will be reconsidered in order to
develop team -work, to improve work conditions as well as safety. Basic
production, up and downstream from the company, will be governed by
planning, "which Implies that investments be controlled by workers'
representatives, that the commercial market (in particular with foreign
countries) be under the control of the proletarian State.
The difficulties are great, the dangers many. In the first
place, the workers will be confronted with a multitude of problems;
sabotage, deterioration, lack of technical capacities in certain areas.
On the other hand, careerists "will be numerous and "will seek to place
themselves -well. Bureaucracy may get hold. This means that from
the beginning it "will be necessary to create a permanent means of re-
moving ambitious leaders, who attempt to safeguard their personal
interests.
The perspective of-workers' control determines the con-
tent of demands in the educational realm. The educated "work force of
the present must place itself in the service of capital. If we -want the'
workers to be able to take over production, we must impose a solid
413
general education, excluding mulitating specialization. But this is con-
trary to the goals pursued by the government and the present faculty.
There too the destruction of present structures is needed,
4, Ma_ss organizing is basic. If councils continue to be
the goal, various steps must be distinguished:
- Revolutionary militants must get organized. This should
be understood, to mean that those -who led struggles in the factories, both
against the bosses and against the union leadership, must prepare
evaluational meetings economic sector by sector. At first, at the level
of the factory, by asking for the holding of a general assembly of union
members, open to the non-unionized, because the floor should be given
to all those who sought to unite with the students, whatever the dictates
of the leaderships, -who saw the leaders' attempts to co-optation, who
said no to sectorial negotiations and finally, to those "who tore up their
union card.
Then gathered in sectprial coherences which would con-
sider the struggle against the management hierarchy, the economic
perspectives of the sector, its purpose within the economy as a 'whole,
the necessary conditions of a control over all the activities of the branch.
- The coordination of struggles is not a .mere technical
problem. It presupposes a global view on all fundamental questions:
destruction of the bourgeois apparatus, elimination of reformist con-
ceptions, political expression of the rank, and file workers, the
attitude toward the middle strata. This implies the intervention of a
revolutionary party. But, this party does not exist. It will be born in
the course of future struggles. But starting today the construction of
this party must be considered, avoiding the present caricatures prop-
agated by numerous political groups.
5. Today the action committees must act in the light of
this goal. With sustained propaganda, agitation; they must bring the
debates out into the open:
- by demystifying electoralism, by engaging Left candidates
in polemic, by frontally attacking all conceptions -which justify parlia-
mentary action (that is to say, by holding public discussions, led by
militants, by contestation in the meetings of the Communist Party, of
the P.S.U., by sending open letters to candidates, by holding meeting-
debates -with the action, committees. . . );
- by giving a precise definition to the ideological and organ-
izational achievements furnished by the crisis. Direct action and mass
organization proved their efficacity;
- by considering the economic and political future of
France and Europe (rising prices, unemployment, local disparities. . .);
- by struggling against all co-optative attempts by the
"Left" machines;
- by struggling against the bourgeois offensive, which seeks
to integrate what suits it perfectly (paritary commissions in the schools,
the autonomy of the universities. . . );
i r»
- by giving solidarity in all its forms to the organizations
disbanded by the government;
- by developing a program of union demands, designed to
force the government into a corner;
- by showing the necessary steps to the attainment of
total control over production.
Then it "will be necessary to coordinate various initiatives
by proposing campaign themes, in order to provide a precise framework
for propaganda, in order to deal with the present decline of the move-
ment (example: action relating to the unemployed, who remain unorgan-
ized).
The decline has begun. "All returns to order", it is said.
The proof? "Gangsters" have returned to work again and have already
robbed several banks. The bourgeois order takes on again its daily
aspect. Habits return. The electoral campaign is at its peak. Capital
has its logic.
But the class struggle has its logic too. Nothing will stop
it. New strikes, new explosions will take place, whether it be in France
or in the other European countries. Because European society is sick.
Already the student revolt surprised Italy, Germany. The Belgian
bourgeoisie remains still very divided, unable as it is to resolve regional
problems, Wilson is contested more each day. Spain had to devaluate '
its currency. The recession is there. All this because the "golden
age" of European capitalism is over. If from about 1950 to 1963, it was
416
able to win new markets, to consolidate its political and administrative
structures, for several years now things have not been the same.
Competition between the U.S.A. and the European countries, as between
these latter, has intensified: the revolution is going •well in Vietnam,
it takes shape in Latin America. Tomorrow all capitalists will have to
confront an explosive situation. Europe will be harshly confronted.
Millions of workers will say no! Thousands and thousands
of revolutionaries, will be each day more numerous, more committed,
more combative, more organized. Violence, prohibitions will multiply
to meet them. But it makes no difference!
Solidarity will develop. Class consciousness will become
stronger. The workers' organization 'will take shape. Internationalism
will come out on top.
TOWARD A REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT?
After the May days, political life can never return to its
normal course, its daily rhythm. The elections, no doubt, mark a
temporary withdrawal of revolutionary possibilities; they open a period
in which grocers, professors and officers will again believe in the
eternity of their France. But everyone knows, in his heart of hearts,
that the contradictions are insurmountable and that the movement will
start up again. And the methods employed in the course of the most
combative days, street fighting, barricades, occupations of -work places,
417
etc. , will be taken up again, developed, improved by the -workers and
students as soon as they find an occasion for entering massively Into
action: these fighting methods are now part of the tradition of the
French workers' movement,
Such certitude must not be accompanied by an unconditional
optimism: the movementjwi 11^ surely be rebpr n, but just^ajs_su£ely^ = it
will^begJ3ea.ten by the bourgeolsie1=jwhi^ch has_already learned the les sons
of the explosion of__May_ ' 68, if it does......ng^find^the .means to organize
itgejfj^jtogive _itself a political direction. It has been shown that revol-
utionary situations can exist in capitalist societies that modern theore-
ticians described as unchangeable. The breadth and vigor of the intiative
of the masses was reaffirmed for those who had forgotten it. Revolu-
tionaries must register these positive facts and remember them when
the ebbing of the tide demoralizes some. But it is not their role to go
into ecstasies; it is to detect the weaknesses of a movement In order to
correct them. But, the -weakness of the May movement was the other
side of its strength In the early days: spontaneity became improvisation
and, from day to day, one saw the serious consequences of demonstrations
without objectives, scattered barricades, isolated confrontations. Yes,
tomorrow again power will be In the street; but it will not victoriously
remain there unless the vanguard, -which led it there is unified, and
assembled.
This conclusion Is all the .more obvious as the days of May
'68 marked the failure or the limits of the existing organizations. A
4 1 8
distinct failure, the consequences of -which will make themselves felt in
the long run, of the P. C.F. and the C.G.T. Limits of all the groups
and movements of the extreme Left which, even when they were present
at all stages of the struggle - which -was the case with several of them -
could not play the role of organizing centre of the movement. Through-
out the days of demonstrations the students and young workers manifested
an extreme distrust with regard to everything that could appear tradition-
al, from a concern for democracy pushed to the extreme. One can suggest
many different explanations for this state of mind, 'which was accompanied
by a flourishing of black flags in demonstrations. One can evoke the
youth of the majority of demonstrations, their justified hostility toward
the faults of preceding generations; one can refer to the deep scars left
by 40 years of Stalinism. This is not -what is important. The essential
thing is to observe that a vanguard emergeji, that it is^igj:^j,njiwillLnot be
unified by any existing or^anLgation, th_at^
c ent r alis ti c_ j_ojrrnulae_.
This is -why it would be useless to seek to respond to the
need for organization revealed by the May days by a .mere reaffirmation
of the necessity of a revolutionary party. Of this necessity we are con-
vinced. But a party is not only a perfectly elaborated program, nor a
massively -widespread press and agitational means; it is the assembling
of a sufficient number of .militants implanted in the essential sectors of
the workers' movement. Such a result cannot be achieved in several
weeks, starting out from nothing or very little. But today, even if they
413
assembled all their contacts, the groups of the extreme Left are near
zero so far as their Implantation In the working class Is concerned. It
Is necessary therefore to maintain the long term, perspective of a
revolutionary "workers' party, but to refuse, in the very Interest of
this perspective, to play at being a party, brandishing emblems,
juggling 'with a skeletal organization. The only re^sult would be to
discredit the very notion of a party for years to come. The task today
Is to consider the concrete steps corresponding to the present state of
the movement by which to accomplish the unification of the vanguard and
Its linking up with the "workers.
The first step should be the constitution of a movement,
sufficiently broad In its organizational forms so that all the militants,
all the groups -which fought in the street can get together in It. This
movement "would be the acquisition of the struggle of May, the organ-
izational outcome of the struggle of the students and workers. It Is in
this framework that the conclusions of the weeks of strikes and demon-
strations could be drawn, In -which the debates and confrontations over
the program and methods of struggle to come could take place.
Such an attempt is obviously not without Its dangers.
Behind the project of a "movement" very different ideas may confront
each other: those of partisans of a mere front for the existing groups,
without a real common organization; those of amateur .machine politicians,
coming usually from the P. C. F. criticizing Its policies but without
abandoning its organizational conceptions, and imagining that an emblem,
a centre and several hundred members can be the origin of a rapid re-
cruitment of millions of militants. Very negative tendencies may de-
velop in the confusion which threatens to emerge from all lack of pre-
cision on these questions. Amateurs of personal public relations, for
whom politics is a replay of the parimutual, which consists in placing in
disorderly fashion Ho Chi Minh, Fidel Castro and Che Guevara in para-
electoral speeches, can use a movement the political bases of which
are imprecise. "Intelligent observers", numerous in the university,
•who have not taken part in the struggle, can find the palliative for their
insolvency in action, in membership in an unformed group.
Some points must therefore be clarified "without ambiguity.
1. To achieve maximum efficacy, the unification of the
revolutionaries who appeared in the struggle of May should have been
organized during the days when the strikes and the demonstrations
reached their peak (from about M,ay 13 to 20), Then it was possible to
reach agreement on immediate tasks, the accomplishment of "which
would have accelerated numerous militants' break with traditional
organizations. This was made impossible by the procrastination, the
maneuvers, the bureaucratic manipulations of part of those who had been
put in "leadership" positions by the first days of struggle. An opport-
unity was__mis s ed. It is not too late to work on the formation of a
movement. But everyone must understand that, for some time to come,
events will not facilitate our task. The stimulant which, momentarily,
2 1
is no longer provided by extra-parliamentary struggle must be replaced
by a greater political precision.
2, A revolutionary movement must assemble the largest
possible number of students and workers "who fought on the barricades.
In the immediate future, in spite of their -weaknesses, in spite of their
uncertain future, the action committees are the place in -which the les-
sons of recent experiences can be collectively learned. A revolutionary
movement worthy of the name should be the expression of these action
committees. It should give Itself no organizational structure - in any
case more apparent than real - which would make It appear as a rival
of the action committees, so long as these latter pursue their political
experiment.
3. The assembling of the vanguard of students, of young
people who made the greatness of May '68 is an indispensable step. But
the revolutionary movement •will not progress In a significant -way until
It will have assembled a sufficient number of worker militants. In-
teresting experiments have already been made in Paris and the prov-
inces with various worker-student liaison committees. They should be
pursued, enlarged - as much as possible. But It should be noted that
these are generally workers without great responsibilities in the union
movement, -workers from secondary companies -who joined the student
movement. The phenomenon is perfectly normal and the value of the
work which can be pursued starting out from the nuclei formed in the
struggle is not lessened for that matter. But a major goal remains;
422
to win militants who, in the CGT and also often in the CFDT, constitute
the real cadres of the workers' movement in the enterprise - the dele-
gates, the rank and file leaders. May '68 created a new given in this
area: contestation of the policies of the union leaderships occurred
widely in the working^ class itseIf. The CGT and sections of the PCF
are shaken by discussions, which sometimes become violent. In any
case, these discussions -will not lead immediately to massive organiza-
tional splits. It will take a rather long process for factory militants to
lose all faith in the organization which serves as a framework for their
struggle. Inscribed as the first point in a revolutionary movement's
work plan should be the task of organizing this split. This Implies
propaganda, liaison and action around a program of struggle such as
the one we sketched above in Its essential lines.
In such conditions, the revolutionary unification which re-
mains on the agenda must dedicate Itself at first:
- to propa.ganda__campaigns, by means of posters, tracts,
public meetings. The denounciatlon of electoral perspectives, of the
Illusions about the peaceful 'way; the development of internationalist
themes (anti-Imperialist struggles, coordination of struggles on the
European scale, and the struggle against repression); the explanation
of the necessity for a revolutionary organization, different from the
existing parties: such can be the themes of these campaigns;
- j_oj3olitical disjrassions of the widest and most public
sort, on the strategy which revolutionaries should adopt to approach
4.23
the next stages of the struggle.
It becomes obvious, from this point of view, that the es-
sential instrument of struggle must be a mass^newsgager. This news-
paper, the publication of •which should be preceded by the adoption of a
political platform common to all the participants, would be simultaneously
the forum for free discussion by committees and -worker militants, the
organizer of propaganda campaigns and the place for a permanent
confrontation on all the problems posed by the future of the struggle.
Thus conceived, it would attain a distribution which would go far beyond
the present limits of the recruitment of a revolutionary movement. But
at the same time, by proposing themes for action as well as political
perspectives, it would be an organizational instrument, preparing future
steps in the revolutionary unification.
These proposals may seem very minimal after the exciting
struggles of the month of May. They are, however, the ones "which
correspond with the present balance of forces between the bourgeoisie
and the bureaucratic machines on the one hand, and on the other, the
vanguard militants. The repressions, the disillusionments consequent
on failures, the confusion born of badly led attempts will make the task
of revolutionaries difficult for some time to come. This Is a supplement-
ary reason to persist in struggle for these objectives, which constitute
the starting point for assembling the vanguard in view of preparing new
May '68s.
We have entered a new period of general crisis of
capitalism. The breadth of mass struggles will surprise those who
believe comfortably in the eternity of the economic "miracles" of the
bourgeoisie, those who piously live on the memories of October '17,
which they have locked up in their desk drawers.
It falls on all of us, on all those who found the path of
struggle in the street, to prepare for tomorrow the revolutionary
organization -which will learn the lessons from recent struggles and
prepare new fights.
And tomorrow, the revolution will come!
Paris, June 17, 1968.
Category
Author
Title
Post-May Perspectives
Date
Translation of
Keywords